نقض الحكم وضمانه عند أبي الوليد الباجي (ت 474هـ) [Judgment Annulment and Liability in the Thought of Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474 AH)]

Abstract

This research examines the issue of judicial annulment and the guarantee of the judge, a delicate subject in Islamic jurisprudence due to its implications for the stability of rulings and the protection of rights. Despite its importance, the methodology of Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī—a leading authority of the Mālikī school—has not received sufficient attention in this regard. The study addresses this gap by analyzing al-Bājī’s treatment of judicial annulment and judicial guarantees, highlighting his legal perspectives and foundational principles, especially in cases of conflicting rulings, judicial error, or misconduct. It aims to clarify the legal and methodological principles underpinning his views, analyze the conditions and criteria he established for annulling judicial rulings, examine his stance on judicial guarantees, and assess their alignment with or divergence from the Mālikī school. It also seeks to situate his methodology within the realities of the Andalusian judicial system. Methodologically, the research adopts investigative, analytical, and comparative approaches. The findings indicate that al-Bājī articulated a precise framework for distinguishing between rulings subject to annulment and those that are not, rooted in Mālikī legal theory and jurisprudential maxims. He combined textual evidence with purposive reasoning to formulate balanced criteria for annulment, emphasizing that annulment is not absolute but subject to stringent conditions that preserve justice and judicial stability. Al-Bājī also developed a nuanced view of the judge’s liability in cases of error or negligence, linking it to the degree of jurisprudential effort exerted and the nature of the mistake. Furthermore, he offered a coherent vision for judicial appeals and annulments, demonstrating an advanced organizational awareness of judicial practice. His approach stands out for balancing fidelity to the Mālikī school with pragmatic reasoning suited to Andalusian realities. The study concludes that al-Bājī grounded judicial guarantees in the higher objectives of Sharīʿah—not to shield judges unconditionally or burden them excessively, but to uphold justice and accountability within the limits of human capacity.